In this paper, we propose an empirical model of Internet adoption which takes into account the household's desire to adopt the Internet. Our research supports three central …ndings. First, we determine the main factors that explain the cross-sectional variance in gross bene…ts. Second, we show that while the cross-sectional variance in the predicted probability that a household desires to adopt the Internet and does not because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts is relatively low (except for the age factor), the cross-sectional variance in the predicted probability that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet is high. Third, we compute the predicted adoption probability assuming that the adoption costs are homogeneous across households. We show that, for a given dimension (except for the age factor), the adoption rate will be only slightly modi…ed if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households.
Introduction
While the development of information and communication technologies in the late 20th century created hope for a reduction of inequalities by promoting a greater and more egalitarian access to information throughout the population, research on the di¤usion of information and communication technologies has shown on the contrary a widening of inequalities with the creation of a digital illiterate class. These disparities in the di¤usion and the appropriation of new technologies have often been referred to as the "digital divide" since the mid-1990s.
Numerous papers have analyzed the digital divide in Internet connection. A consensus has emerged concerning the central role of certain factors -including residential area, income, education, age, presence of children -to explain the households'choice to adopt the Internet. 1 Then, in order to understand the ethnic digital divide better, new variables assumed correlated with the variable "ethnic group"were introduced, such as lack of skills (see, e.g., Krueger, 2000) , lack of friends and relatives using the new technologies (see, e.g., Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002) 2 and …nally the quality of service available 3 and the degree of competition 4 in the households'residential location (see, e.g., Prieger and Hu, 2008) . In these papers only the net bene…ts of Internet adoption are identi…ed.
Thus, they do not allow identifying if cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in costs or in gross bene…ts.
Identifying if the digital divide in Internet connection is mainly due to di¤erences in costs or in gross bene…ts has implications for policy makers. Indeed, if cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in costs, then stimulating the reduction of Internet service costs and promoting the abundance of free (public) Internet access locations will e¤ectively help to reduce the digital gap. However, if cross-sectional variance is driven by gross bene…ts (or perceived gross bene…ts when, for example, potential adopters cannot accurately forecast the gross bene…ts of Internet adoption) it would be more e¢ cient to inform the non-users about the opportunities o¤ered by the Internet, and also to promote access to the digital skills which are required for e¢ cient use of the Internet in order to encourage Internet adoption. 1 A non-exhaustive list of work using cross-sectional data includes: U.S. Department of Commerce (1995 Commerce ( , 1999 , Chaudhuri et al. (2005) , Chaudhuri and Flamm (2007) ; while Prieger and Hu (2009) provide a dynamic approach of the digital divide. 2 Notice that the purpose of their analysis is not Internet adoption, but computer adoption. 3 The quality of service is measured by the distance of households from the central o¢ ce -the smaller the distance, the higher the speed o¤ered by ADSL. 4 The main idea is that competition can increase Internet adoption because it leads to price cuts and quality improvements.
In this paper, we propose a model in which the household's decision to adopt the Internet is analyzed sequentially. Prior to subscribing to an Internet service provider, the household considers the need for an Internet connection at home. Subsequently, conditional to a need for an Internet connection at home, the household chooses whether to adopt the Internet or not by comparing its adoption costs to its gross bene…ts of adoption. Therefore, contrary to the papers cited above, the digitally excluded population can be separated into two groups. In the …rst group, we …nd the households that are not interested in adopting the Internet; in the second group, we …nd the households that desire to adopt the Internet but do not do so because their adoption costs are higher than their gross bene…ts of adoption.
Our research supports three central …ndings. First, we determine the main factors that explain the cross-sectional variance in gross bene…ts. While it has been expressed in the literature that many of the people on the wrong side of the divide simply do not desire to adopt the Internet, 5 there is not, to our knowledge, any paper which quanti…es the e¤ect of several factors on the gross bene…ts of adoption. Our paper …lls in this gap. In particular, we show that, on average, a wealthy urban household has higher gross bene…ts than a destitute and rural household. These results suggest that degree of urbanization and income capture more than just availability and a¤ordability constraints, respectively. Second, we estimate the predicted non adoption rate and break it down in two parts: on the one hand, the predicted probability that the household does not desire to adopt the Internet, on the other hand, the predicted probability that the household does desire to adopt the Internet and does not adopt it because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts of adoption. While the cross-sectional variance in the predicted probability that a household desires to adopt the Internet and does not because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts is relatively low (except for the age factor), we show that the cross-sectional variance in the predicted probability that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet is high. Third, we compute the predicted adoption probability assuming that the adoption costs are homogeneous across households. We show that, for a given dimension (except for the age factor), the adoption rate will be only slightly modi…ed if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households. These results support the argument that the digital divide is mainly due to di¤erences in gross bene…ts of adoption. Therefore, before taking into consideration inequalities in infrastructure deployment or di¤erences in adoption costs, policy makers which attempt to reduce the digital gap should try to increase the (perceived) gross bene…ts of adoption for the most socially disadvantaged people.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the conceptual framework and the estimation method. In Section 3, we describe the data and the procedure we follow to restrict our sample. In Section 4, we present the results and also analyze two possible explanations that might a¤ect the cross-sectional variance in gross bene…ts. In Section 5, we discuss some policy implications of our results. In Section 6, we provide a short conclusion to this paper.
Empirical framework
In this section, we develop a model of Internet adoption which takes into account the household's desire to adopt the Internet. First, we present the conceptual framework and then we present the estimation method.
Conceptual framework
We note B the household's gross bene…ts of Internet adoption and C the household's costs of adoption. The adoption costs include the …nancial costs of an Internet connection at home (i.e., the monetary cost of signing up with an Internet service provider and the access fee) but also non-monetary costs such as the transportation costs to subscribe to an Internet o¤er or the time taken to install the Internet.
Neither the gross bene…ts of adoption nor the adoption costs are usually observed. For example, previous papers analyzing Internet adoption only observe whether or not the households have adopted the Internet. In other words, they only observe if their net bene…ts of adoption (i.e., B C) are positive or negative. 6 Therefore, households which are not interested in adopting the Internet and the ones which bene…t from an Internet connection at home but not enough to compensate their adoption costs are grouped into the same class: the excluded ones. In our data, aside from observing if the household has adopted the Internet or not, we also observe, for each household without an Internet connection at home, whether or not it desires to adopt the Internet. 7 This supplementary information regarding the household's desire to adopt the Internet or not, allow 6 In a paper analyzing business Internet adoption, Forman et al. (2005) identify the e¤ect of location size on gross bene…ts of Internet adoption. Contrary to our paper, where the household's desire to adopt the Internet is used to identify gross bene…ts of adoption, in their paper, identi…cation is obtained by observing the marginal e¤ect of location for various form of Internet adoption decisions. 7 The way the variable related to the desire has been built is detailed in Subsection 3.1.
us, contrary to the previous papers in the literature, to explicitly separate the digitally excluded population into two groups: on the one hand, the households which do not desire to adopt the Internet, on the other hand, the households which do desire to adopt the Internet but do not do so because their adoption costs are higher than their gross bene…ts of adoption.
We have created two binary variables D i and A i , with D i = 1 if the household i desires to have an Internet connection at home and 0 otherwise, and A i = 1 if the household i has adopted the Internet and 0 otherwise. Since, we do not observe the household's desire to have an internet connection at home if it has one, we assume that, each household with an Internet connection at home has a desire for it. Therefore, in our model, the occurrence D i = 0 and A i = 1 is not possible.
The adoption decision is modeled as a two stage process. In the …rst stage, the household wonders if it needs an Internet connection at home; in the second stage, if there is a need for it, the household subscribes to an Internet o¤er if its gross bene…ts of adoption exceed its adoption costs. Our model is based on the two following equivalence relations: 8 Given that the household's decision is sequential (prior to choosing whether to adopt the Internet or not, the household wonders if there is a need for it), we have that:
A i is observed if and only if D i = 1, and D i is observed for the overall sample. 8 In our model, we assume that wanting to adopt the Internet indicates that the gross bene…ts of adoption are greater than zero. More generally, we could have assumed that wanting to adopt the Internet indicates that the gross bene…ts of adoption are higher than a certain parameter (which is normalized to 0 in our model). The results would not have been modi…ed: only the interpretation of the constant term in the gross bene…ts equation would have changed. The important assumption is that the households are homogeneous to characterize their desire to adopt the Internet. I.e., there is a unique and identical parameter for all of the households, such that a household does not desire (resp., desires) to adopt the Internet if its gross bene…ts of adoption are smaller than (resp., higher than ).
Thus, the household i can fall into one of the three following categories: it does not bene…t from an Internet connection at home (D i = 0), it bene…ts from an Internet connection at home and its gross bene…ts are smaller than its adoption costs (D i = 1; A i = 0), it bene…ts from an Internet connection at home and its gross bene…ts are higher than its adoption costs (D i = 1; A i = 1).
Estimation methodology
We assume that the household i 0 s gross bene…ts of Internet adoption (B i ) and the household i 0 s costs of Internet adoption (C i ) are modeled in the following way:
and
where X i is the vector of explanatory variables 9 and u 1;i and u 2;i are the error terms. The error terms u 1;i and u 2;i are assumed to be normally distributed with mean (0; 0) and variance-covariance matrix , where of parameters as~ 1 ,~ and~ respectively. 10 The observations being independent and identically distributed, the log likelihood L is then given by:
where f (:) denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution and h (:; :) the density function of the bivariate standard normal distribution. The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the model.
The data
This paper was made possible by the availability of a unique database, collected in the form of surveys of French households by INSEE in October 2005. 11 In particular, the database contains information on demographic variables and on ICT 12 equipment of French households.
The dependent variables
In our database, neither the gross bene…ts of adoption nor the adoption costs are observed. Nevertheless, for each household, we observe whether or not it has an Internet connection at home. In case, it does not have one and that the household is composed of at least two people, we observe whether or not each individual in this household wishes to have an Internet connection at home.
Indeed, the question "Do you wish to have an Internet connection at home?" was asked to all individuals living in a household without an Internet connection at home and composed of at least two people (this question was not asked to single person households). In order to determine whether 1 0 Notice that the vector of parameters~ 2 = 2 = 2 is identi…able if we assume that 1 = 2 = or if we assume that = 0. In this paper, we do not go deeper into this identi…cation point for two reasons. First, none of these assumptions are testable. Second, we have to use the estimation of the residual correlation to identify this vector of parameters; its standard deviation being not negligible, the identi…cation of the vector of parameters~ 2 (obtained under one of the two untestable previously mentioned assumptions) will not be robust. 1 13 or if it does not have one but at least one member of its reference group has answer "yes" to the former question. The reference group being de…ned as the group of people that make decisions a¤ecting the household (e.g., regarding the household's consumption). 14 Remarks regarding our way of classifying the households into the three previous categories. First, taking into account only the members of the reference group to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet can be viewed as reductive. For example, one can argue that all the members of the household which are over a certain age should be taken into consideration in order to properly describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet. 15 We have chosen to take into consideration only the desire (to adopt the Internet) of the members of the reference group in order to reduce the e¤ect of the household's size. To ensure the robustness of our results, we have also used other alternatives to de…ne the household's desire to adopt the Internet (i.e., where all the household members which are over a certain age are taken into consideration). Our 1 3 Therefore, as noticed previously, the occurrence Di = 0 and Ai = 1 is not possible in our model. 1 4 In our database, households specify themselves which members belong to the reference group. The children do not usually belong to the reference group. 1 5 Notice that the de…nition used to state whether or not a household desires to adopt the Internet raises two di¤erent potential errors. First, if we take into consideration only the members of the reference group to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet, then it is possible that the desire of some individuals relevant to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet (e.g., a child which is at the university) were erroneously not taken into consideration. Thus, it is possible that Internet adoption is observed only because a third person (who does not belong to the reference group) wanted to have an Internet connection at home and not because at least one of the members of the reference group did it. This potential issue will be captured in the errors terms of the gross bene…ts and the net bene…ts equations. In these cases, the error terms will be large in both equations (and thus positively correlated). Second, in the opposite way, if we take into consideration too many people to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet, then it is possible that the desire of some individuals (e.g., a young child), which do not a¤ect the household's adoption choice, were erroneously taken into consideration. Thus, some households will fall into the category "desire to adopt the Internet but do not do so because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts" while they should fall into the category "do not desire to adopt the Internet." In these cases, while the non-adoption choice is actually due to too low gross bene…ts of adoption, we will erroneously consider that it is due to an a¤ordability issue (i.e., due to too high adoption costs). Thus, the error terms will be large in the gross bene…ts equation and small in the net bene…ts equation (and thus negatively correlated). Therefore, the smaller the number of people taken into consideration to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet, the higher the estimated residual correlation (i.e.,~ ) will be. main results are unchanged. 16 Second, it could be inaccurate to conclude that a household desires to adopt the Internet when at least one member of its reference group has answered "yes" to the question "Do you wish to have an Internet connection at home?." For example, if the household's gross bene…ts are de…ned as the sum of members'gross bene…ts, then it could be possible that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet even if one member of its reference group desires to do so. 17 If the potential bene…ts from an Internet connection at home are considered as higher than potential disadvantages, the likelihood of encountering such cases is low. Furthermore, notice that the adoption-making mechanism could also be something di¤erent of "maximizing the sum of members' gross bene…ts." For example, a household could choose whether to adopt the Internet or not under the principle of maximizing the member's utility with the higher value among the members of its reference group. Rationality of such extreme group decision-making rule is supported by group decision theory (see, Zhang et al., 2009 ). In this case, observing that at least one member of the reference group desires to adopt the Internet will be a su¢ cient condition to ensure that the household desires to do so. There is no clear a priori criterion to select which type of adoption-making mechanism is more suitable. This could probably be tested. However, this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
Sample restriction
The database contains initially 5603 observations and is composed of two parts: one at the household level and the other at the individual level. In each household, one individual (belonging or not to the reference group) was randomly drawn to participate to a detailed (individual) investigation.
All the households in which the individual drawn to participate to this detailed investigation did not belong to the reference group have been excluded from the sample. 18 After the exclusion of missing data, the "whole" sample contains 4491 observations. Since the question "Do you wish to have an Internet connection at home?" was not asked to single person households, it is not possible to de…ne whether or not households with a single person desire to adopt the Internet. Therefore, single person households must be excluded from the sample. 19 Once the single person households have been excluded, 3114 observations remain. Among these 3114 observations, there are 2872 households in which the reference group is composed of two people. To the extent that a household will be more likely to desire to have an Internet connection at home that the number of people belonging to its reference group is high, 20 only households in which the reference group is composed of two people have been kept. 21 These selection rules leave us with a total of 2872 cases for the empirical analysis. Table 1 From Table 1 we can see that 40.2% of the households do not desire to adopt the Internet, 14.7%
of the households desire to adopt the Internet but did not adopt it because their gross bene…ts of adoption are smaller than their adoption costs and …nally 45.1% of the households have adopted the Internet. A detailed description and descriptive statistics 27 of these variables are summarized in Table 2 .
The explanatory variables
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 show the means of the explanatory variables on the selected sample (i.e., the one used to estimated the model) and on the whole sample, respectively. 28 2 2 A constant term is added to these explanatory variables. 2 3 We have created one variable related to the individual's technophilia. This variable is labeled computer and takes two values, 1 if she/he has already used a computer, 0 otherwise. 2 4 Similar to Suire (2007), we have created two variables related to the social environment of the individual. The …rst variable is labeled association. This variable takes two values, 1 if she/he is an active member of an association, 0 otherwise. This variable concerns the capital within the meaning of Putnam (1993) . According to Putnam, being a member of an association strengthens, among other things, the trust between individuals. The second is named friends. This variable takes two values, 1 if she/he meets with her/his friends at least once a week, 0 otherwise. This variable refers, stricto sensu, to the social network (i.e., the number of acquaintances). 2 5 See Guillemin and Roux (2001) for further investigation on the weighting of income. 2 6 We have created one variable related to the household's technophilia. This variable is labeled mobile and takes three values, 0 if the household does not have any mobile phone, 1 if it has one mobile phone and 2 otherwise. 2 7 Apart from the variable number of persons and mobile, all other variables are binary variables. Therefore we do not defer in this table the minimum, the maximum and the variance of each variable. Concerning the variable number of persons, its minimum value is 1 (resp., 2), its maximum value is 9, and its standard deviation is 1.23 (resp., 1.08) in the whole sample (resp., in the selected sample). Concerning the variable mobile, its minimum value is 0, its maximum value is 2 and its standard deviation is 0.49 (resp. 0.48) in the whole sample (resp., the selected sample). 2 8 In the whole sample, the households are, on average, more destitute and living in a more urbanized area than the ones in the selected sample. Moreover, the variability of the age distribution is higher in the whole sample than in the selected sample. 4 The results Table 3 provides the estimation results. 29 All results in Table 3 are marginal e¤ects. 30 Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3 presents the marginal e¤ects for the probabilities that the household desires to adopt the Internet, that the household has adopted the Internet given that it has a desire to do so and that the household has adopted the Internet, respectively. We carried out a Wald test of the null hypothesis that residual correlation~ is equal to zero against the alternative that it is di¤erent from zero. A Wald test rejects at the 10% level the null hypothesis that the residual correlation~ is equal to zero. 31 2 9 When the same independent variables appear in both of equations (i.e., equations (3) and (4)) the model is technically identi…ed, but identi…cation only occurs on the basis of distributional assumptions about the residuals alone and is not due to variation in the explanatory variables. In order to increase the precision of the estimation, three explanatory variables (friends, Ob and Oc) were excluded from the net bene…ts equation (i.e., equation (4)). When they are added to the set of explanatory variables used in the net bene…ts equation, these three variables do not have signi…cant e¤ect. Therefore, they are good candidates for valid exclusion.
The estimation results
3 0 These marginal e¤ects are based on the average level of the covariates. For example, for the income, everything else equal to the average level of the covariates, Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the di¤erence between the probability that a household with an income higher than 2000 euros desires to adopt the Internet and the probability that a household with an income lower than 899 euros desires to adopt the Internet is equal to 0.230. 3 1 Notice that in the model where all the household members which are over 15 years old are taken into consideration to de…ne the household's desire to adopt the Internet, a Wald test does not reject at the 10% level the null hypothesis that the residual correlation~ is equal to zero (see, Table 7 in Appendix I for the estimation results). The reason of this di¤erence is discussed in Footnote 15. Besides, the only signi…cant di¤erences between the results in Table 3 and in Table 7 are those regarding the marginal e¤ects of the variables related to the age of the older child in the household. This is a basic automatic e¤ect attributable to the way used to describe the household's desire to adopt the Internet The e¤ects of socio-economic factors on the gross bene…ts of adoption are displayed in Column (1) of Table 3 . Interestingly, the income and the degree of urbanization positively a¤ect the household's gross bene…ts of adoption. Those results suggest that the budgetary constraint is not the only reason why, on average, destitute households are less connected to the Internet than wealthy households and also that higher infrastructure deployment in the urban areas than in the rural areas cannot entirely explain the "rural digital divide." Recalling that the di¤usion of the Internet heavily relies upon intensive interactions between people, 32 spatial proximity as well as belonging to a group where Internet usage is widespread might increase the value of Internet adoption. Therefore, network e¤ects could partly explain why an urban, wealthy and educated 33 household has, on average, higher gross bene…ts of adoption than a rural, less wealthy and less educated household.
Column (2) of Table 3 shows that the main determinants cited in the literature to explain the digital divide in Internet connection -the income, the residential area, 34 education -are still signi…cant when the sample is restricted to households which desire to adopt the Internet. Indeed, conditionally to the desire for it, wealthy, educated households located in high income area are more likely to have adopted the Internet than destitute, uneducated households located in low income area. 35 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show that the income, the residential area and the education a¤ect the gross bene…ts of adoption and the net bene…ts of adoption provided that the household desires to adopt the Internet in the same way (i.e., the sign of the marginal e¤ects are similar).
This similarity is not veri…ed for every socio-economic factors. Indeed, whereas the gross bene…ts are negatively a¤ected by the age, we …nd that provided that they desire to adopt the Internet, young households (i.e., younger than 30 years old) are not more willing to adopt the Internet than others. This result is even reversed. Provided that they desire to adopt the Internet, households with residents in their twenties are less likely to have adopted the Internet than the others. The 3 2 For example, Goldfarb (2006) shows that people living with students in the Mid-1990s are more likely to have adopted the Internet in 2001. He notices that one of the explanation could be that the Internet may exhibit network externalities and thus the bene…ts of adoption will increase if a household member is online (because of university attendance in the mid-1990s). 3 3 To the extent that they communicate mostly with others that have identical educational background and income, people with high salary and high education degree are more likely to know someone that has adopted the Internet. 3 4 Notice that only the average income in the area has a signi…cant e¤ect. Provided that the household desires to adopt the Internet, the population density does not signi…cantly a¤ect the probability of adoption. 3 5 This result must be interpreted with caution: it does not imply that these variables (the income, the residential area, education) have an e¤ect on the adoption costs. Indeed, the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption provided that the household desires to adopt the Internet might be due to di¤erences in adoption costs as well as di¤erences in gross bene…ts of adoption. For example, if the adoption costs were independent of the variable x and the gross bene…ts were increasing with the variable x, then the variable x will have a positive e¤ect on the probability that the household has adopted the Internet provided that it desires to do so.
fact that the households in the twenties age bracket have smaller net bene…ts of adoption provided that they desire to adopt the Internet and also higher gross bene…ts of adoption indicates that, in the sub-population of households desiring to adopt the Internet, the adoption costs are higher for people in their twenties than for the others.
Divided the digitally excluded group into two parts
In addition to determine the main factors that a¤ect the gross bene…ts of adoption and the net bene…ts of adoption provided that the household desires to adopt the Internet, our second contribution is to quantify (for various socio-economic characteristics) what percentage of the divide is due to di¤erences in interest levels and what percentage is due to di¤erences in a¤ordability levels. Thereafter, we can analyze whether the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in costs or in gross bene…ts. To this end, we have calculated the predicted adoption and non-adoption rates. The predicted non-adoption rate is divided into two parts: on the one hand, the predicted probability that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet (i.e., p (D i = 0=X i )), on the other hand, the predicted probability that a household desires to adopt the Internet and does not because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts (i.e., p (D i = 1; A i = 0=X i )).
In order to gain understanding of the variability of the adoption costs, these predicted rates are also computed assuming that the adoption costs were homogeneous across households. The value of the homogeneous adoption costs is calibrated such that the predicted probability that an "average" household (i.e., with the average level of the covariates) has adopted the Internet is unchanged whether the adoption costs are homogeneous or not. 36 The predicted probabilities that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet, that a household desires to adopt the Internet and does not because its adoption costs are higher than its gross bene…ts and that a household has an Internet connection at home are displayed in columns 3 6 Denoting by K the value of the homogeneous adoption costs, K is such that p X^ 1 K + w1 > 0= X = p X^ 1 + w1 > 0; X^ + w2 > 0= X , with w1 and w2 the error terms assumed to be normally distributed with mean (0; 0) and variance-covariance matrix^
X the average level of the covariates,^ 1 ,^ and^ the estimated values of~ 1 ,~ and~ , respectively. Thus, if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households, the predicted probability that a household i with the covariates Xi adopt the Internet is equal to p Xi^ 1 + w1 K=Xi and the predicted probability that a household i with the covariates Xi is interested in adopting the Internet and does not do so because its gross bene…ts of adoption are lower than the homogeneous adoption costs is equal to p 0 < Xi^ 1 + w1 < K=Xi .
(1), (2) and (3) of Table 4 , respectively. The similar predicted probabilities when the adoption costs are assumed to be homogeneous across households are displayed in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 4 , respectively. These predicted rates are based on the average level of the covariates.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that a signi…cant proportion of households, and particularly the most socially disadvantaged ones, simply does not desire to adopt the Internet. For example, 49.8% of the most destitute households and 53% of the less educated ones do not desire to adopt the Internet. Furthermore, it shows that, for a given dimension, the predicted probability that a household does not desire to adopt the Internet varies signi…cantly according to which category the household belongs (i.e., most destitute vs. wealthiest, less educated vs. most educated...).
For instance, the most destitute households are approximately two times more likely to not be interested in adopting the Internet than the wealthiest ones.
On the contrary, the cross-sectional variance in the predicted probability that a household desires to adopt the Internet and does not do so is relatively low (except for the age factor). Furthermore, this variability is partly attributable to di¤erences in gross bene…ts.
The small di¤erences (except for the age factor) between the results in Column (3) and in
Column (6) of Table 4 indicate that the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in gross bene…ts of adoption. For example, while the wealthiest households are 88% more likely to adopt the Internet than the destitute households, Column (6) of Table 4 shows that the wealthiest households will still be 75% more likely to adopt the Internet than the destitute ones if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households.
Some comments are in order with regard to the uneducated category. Our result suggest that the adoption costs of the uneducated households are similar to the ones of an "average" household.
Indeed, the adoption rate of the uneducated households is (almost) unchanged whether the adoption costs are homogeneous across households or not. This could partly be due to the presence of unobservable variables (correlated with the uneducated category) which a¤ect positively the gross bene…ts of adoption and negatively the adoption costs. From this perspective, the uneducated households could desire to adopt the Internet because they have a high value of an unobservable variable (i.e., because they have large error terms). As a consequence, in the sub-population of households desiring to adopt the Internet, while other households will have a more normal range of value of this unobservable variable, the less educated ones will have a high value of this unobservable variable. Therefore, the uneducated households will be observed as having small adoption costs and a relatively small probability of desiring to adopt the Internet and not doing so (see, Column 2 of Table 4 ).
Finally, as noticed in Subsection 4.1, we can see that the age factor has an opposite e¤ect on gross bene…ts and on adoption costs. Indeed, the young households (with residents in their twenties or thirties) are more likely to be interested in adopting the Internet than the older ones but they are also more likely to encounter an a¤ordability issue (because of higher adoption costs).
Interestingly, while the adoption rate of the households in their twenties is similar to the one of the households in their …fties, Column (6) of Table 4 shows that households in their twenties will be approximately 70% more likely to adopt the Internet than the ones in their …fties if the adoption costs are homogeneous across households.
Analyzing di¤erent patterns to explain the cross-sectional variance in gross bene…ts
In this subsection, we identify two possible explanations that might a¤ect the gross bene…ts of adoption. The two explanations we consider are (i) the level of computer skills and (ii) the expectations regarding the potential bene…ts of using the Internet.
Two explanations
Below, we discuss each of these explanations and describe the devices used to capture this information.
(i) Level of computer skills
In contrast with former innovations in the information and communication markets, such as the phone or the radio, speci…c knowledge is required in order to bene…t entirely from the advantages o¤ered by the Internet. Thus, the lack of computer skills may prevent the appropriation of those bene…ts and discourage Internet adoption. In our data set, we observe for one individual of the reference group whether she/he has already used a computer or not. In case she/he did it, we also observe her/his computer skills. 37 We have created one variable related to the computer skills. This variable is labeled computerskills and takes 7 values according to the number of computer tasks that she/he can accomplish. 38 (ii) Expectations regarding the potential bene…ts of using the Internet Many people on the wrong side of the divide might not perceive the potential usefulness of an Internet connection at home and thus cannot accurately forecast the gross bene…ts of Internet.
In our survey, it was asked to one individual of the reference group if she/he totally agrees, rather agrees, disagrees or totally disagrees with the statement "people who do not use the Internet are disadvantaged." We have created one variable related to the opinion regarding the potential disadvantage of not using the Internet. 39 This variable is labeled expectation and takes 4 values. 40 It is not a debate about what is plausible, since it is clear that uninformed and unskilled people have lower gross bene…ts of adoption than well-informed and skilled ones. 41 The empirical question is how do these di¤erent patterns vary with the socio-economic characteristics.
How do these di¤erent patterns vary with the socio-economic characteristics?
To determine how the computer skills vary with the socio-economic characteristics, we estimate two models. In the …rst one (Model A), the dependent variable is computer 42 (we use a probit model).
In the second one (Model B), the dependent variable is computerskills (we use an ordered probit model). Only the individuals who have already used a computer are kept to estimate Model B. To determine how the opinion regarding the potential disadvantage of not using the Internet varies with the socio-economic characteristics, we estimate an ordered probit model (Model C) in which the dependent variable is expectation. 43 The explanatory variables used to estimate these models are similar to those used in the main model (see, Table 2 ). The estimation results of models A, B, C are displayed in Table 5 . 3 9 Notice that 94 individuals did not answer to this question. Therefore, we have only 2778 observations. 4 0 The variable expectation is equal to 3 if she/he totally agrees, 2 if she/he rather agrees, 1 if she/he disagrees and 0 if she/he totally disagrees with the statement "people who do not use the Internet are disadvantaged." Descriptive statistics of the variable expectation are displayed in Table 9 in Appendix II. 4 1 For example, while 88.7% of the individuals with the highest level of computer skills have adopted the Internet or desire to do so, only 30.9% of the individuals who have never used a computer have adopted the Internet or desire to do so. In the same manner, while 80.5% of the individuals that totally agree with the statement "people who do not use the Internet are disadvantaged" have adopted the Internet or desire to do so, only 40.6% of the individuals that totally disagree with this statement have adopted the Internet or desire to do so. See Appendix II for further descriptive statistics. 4 2 Description and summary statistics of the variable computer are displayed in Table 2 . 4 3 This model has been estimated twice: with and without the explanatory variables Ob and Oc. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that the computer skills are unequally distributed in the population. Indeed, the socially disadvantaged (uneducated, low income) and elderly people are less likely to have already used a computer. However, provided that they have already used it, destitute people do not have fewer computer skills than wealthy ones. Thus, income is identi…ed as a barrier to computer use, but once this barrier is overcome, there is not any signi…cant di¤erence in computer knowledge between destitute and wealthy people.
Column (3) of Table 5 shows that destitute people are less likely than wealthy people to agree with the statement that "people who do not use the Internet are disadvantaged." This result suggests that the negative relation between the income and the gross bene…ts of adoption might partly be due to the fact that destitute people have, on average, lower expectations concerning the usefulness of the Internet. On the contrary, age does not a¤ect the expectations concerning the usefulness of the Internet. Thus, age has mainly a negative e¤ect on the gross bene…ts of adoption, not because older people are not aware of the opportunities o¤ered by the Internet, but because their abilities to appropriate the bene…ts of the Internet are too low (partly because they are not as good as others to use a computer).
Finally, expectations regarding the potential bene…ts of using the Internet are negatively a¤ected by the degree of urbanization, reinforcing the thesis that rural populations are more resistant to new technology which could a¤ect their daily lives.
Policy implications
The fact that the number of Internet applications that policymakers consider as socially bene…cial -particularly in relation to education, health and government services -is increasing and that people on the wrong side of the digital divide are likely to engage in many of these online activities if given access (see, Goldfarb and Prince, 2008) , are strong arguments in favor of a public intervention to facilitate Internet adoption. 44 If a public intervention is socially desirable (i.e., its social bene…ts surpass its social costs), a central question remains regarding the form of this intervention.
We have shown previously that prior to having an a¤ordability issue, a large part of the excluded population has a motivational problem and also that the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in gross bene…ts of adoption. This is why, if desirable, a policy that aims to reduce the digital divide should, …rst, try to increase the (perceived) gross bene…ts of adoption, before taking into consideration di¤erences in adoption costs.
Notice that a public intervention considering only the a¤ordability issue (i.e., an intervention that aims only at reducing the adoption costs through Internet access subsidies or technical assistance to install the Internet) will have two main drawbacks. First, only excluded households that desire to adopt the Internet will eventually be encouraged to do so. Therefore, such intervention will have an incentive e¤ect only on a limited part of the digitally excluded population: in our sample, the households without an Internet connection at home and desiring to adopt the Internet represent less than 27% of the total excluded population. Second, reducing the adoption costs could have a perverse e¤ect by increasing, in particular, the "generational digital divide." Indeed, contrary to the young households who encounter mainly an a¤ordability issue, the non-adoption choice of the elderly households is mainly due to a lack of gross bene…ts. Thus, reducing the adoption costs will more e¤ectively encourage the young households than the elderly ones to adopt the Internet.
There are several reasons that might explain why a large part of the population has too low gross bene…ts of adoption. As shown in Subsection 4.3, many people on the wrong side of the divide might not perceive the usefulness of having an Internet connection at home (particularly, the destitute and less educated ones). Therefore, it is necessary to inform non-users about the 
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze whether the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in adoption costs or in gross bene…ts of adoption. To this end, we have proposed a model where the digitally excluded population can be separated into two groups: on the one hand, the households which do not desire to adopt the Internet, on the other hand, the households which do desire to adopt the Internet but do not do so because their adoption costs are higher than their gross bene…ts of adoption. Our results show that a large part of the population is not interested in adopting the Internet and that the cross-sectional variance in Internet adoption is mainly due to di¤erences in gross bene…ts.
Nowadays, in the developed countries, universal broadband accessibility at a basic speed turns out to be a secondary issue. Indeed, broadband is accessible through various electronic devices (e.g., computers, mobile phones), in various places (e.g., at home, in public places), for attractive price and almost universally. 45 Therefore, before wondering how to guarantee broadband access to every resident for a reasonable price within the "broadband for all" debate, 46 policy makers should formulate e¤ective action plans to increase the gross bene…ts of the excluded ones.
does not have one but at least one member over 15 years old has answer "yes" to the question "Do you wish to have an Internet connection at home?." Table 6 shows the sharing out of the households between the three possible categories: D i = 0, D i = 1 and A i = 0, D i = 1 and A i = 1: Table 7 presents the marginal e¤ects for the probabilities that the household desires to adopt the Internet, that the household has adopted the Internet given that it has a desire to do so and that the household has adopted the Internet, respectively. Appendix II Descriptive statistics of the variables computerskills and expectation are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9 , respectively. 
